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CoNTRACTS-OFFER AND AccEPTANCE-EFFECT OF PosT OFFICE REGULA-
TIONS ON Adams v. Lindsell DOCTRINE-Plaintiff, a bidder on a government 
contract, attempted to withdraw its bid upon discovering that it had made 
a mistake in its calculations. The revocation arrived at the government's 
office the same day the acceptance of the bid was mailed. The government's 
invitation to bid provided that "the successful bidder will receive Notice 
of Award ... and such Award will thereupon constitute a binding con-
tract ... .''1 Upon the government's refusal to recognize the revocation, 
the plaintiff brought suit to recover losses resulting from performance at 
the bid price. Held, there was no binding contract. Since the post office 
regulations2 permit withdrawal of mail by the sender any time before 
delivery, an acceptance by mail is not final until the letter reaches its destina-
tion. Thus the revocation ,vas effective, as it arrived at the government 
office before the bidder received the acceptance. Rhode Island Tool Co. 
v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1955) 128 F. Supp. 417. 
It has been a recognized doctrine since Adams v. Lindsell3 that where 
the parties are at a distance from one another and an offer is sent by mail, 
the contract will be consummated when the acceptance is posted.4 Ac-
cordingly, a bid could be effectively revoked only if the withdrawal notice 
1 Principal case at 418. Italics the court's. 
2 39 C.F.R. 42.22, 42.23 (1949). 
s 1 B. & Ald. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (1818). 
4 Henthorn v. Fraser, [1892] 2 Ch. 27; Barnebey v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., (8th Cir. 
1933) 65 F. (2d) 864; 1 CoNTRAcrs REsrATEMENT §§64, 66 (1932). 
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arrived before the acceptance was mailed.5 The decision in the principal 
case upsets these two well established rules on the basis of postal regula-
tions which have been in effect in substantially their present form since 
1889.6 Once before this same court employed the postal regulations to 
repudiate Adams v. Lindsell in a case of an overtaking revocation of an 
acceptance.7 There has been, it is true, considerable criticism of the me-
chanical test of Adams v. Lindsell.8 However, the court overlooked the 
principal policy reason for the doctrine in common law countries. These 
countries have encountered difficulties in making "firm" offers irrevocable. 
In some civil law countries a manifested intent of the offeror that the 
offer be irrevocable for a stated period is given full effect so that the offeree 
can act during that period without risk of revocation.9 At common law it 
has been thought impossible to achieve this result without a seal or con-
sideration.10 So the Adams v. Lindsell doctrine, by forming a contract on 
the posting of the acceptance, permits immediate reliance by the offeree 
without fear of a subsequent revocation of the offer arriving before the 
acceptance is received by the offeror.11 This shifting of the reliance risk 
to the offeror is justifiable since he initiated the transaction. Pennsylvania 
and New York have enacted statutes which provide for irrevocable offers, 
when requested, for a reasonable or set period of time, without need of 
consideration.12 1£ the remainder of the states eventually follow this lead, 
the Adams v. Lindsell doctrine could be readily dispensed with, but until 
that time its utility continues. 
In both Dick v. United States13 and the principal case, the court's deci-
sion seems to have been motivated by a desire to relieve the supplier be-
cause of his unilateral mistake. Without this element it is very doubt-
ful that the court would have been so eager to relieve the supplier and 
to find that no contract resulted. If, for example, a shift in market values 
had made the proposed contract less profitable to the offieror, the reasons 
for permitting revocation would not have been so strong. The result 
reached in the principal case might have been rested on either of two 
other grounds. First, it is clear, even in jurisdictions that follow Adams 
5 Anderson v. Stewart, 149 Neb. 660, 32 N.W. (2d) 140 (1948); Geary v. The Great 
Atlantic 8: Pacific Tea Co., 366 Ill. 625, 10 N.E. (2d) 350 (1937). 
6 See 9 A.L.R. 386 (1920); 92 A.L.R. 1062 (1934). The court in the principal case 
attempted to create the impression that these regulations only recently provided a basis 
for a change of the doctrine. For a critical discussion on the validity of judicial applica-
tion of the postal regulations, see 34 CoRN. L. Q. 632 (1949). 
7 Dick v. United States, (Ct. CI. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 326. 
s See, e.g., Nussbaum, "Comparative Aspects of the Anglo-American Offer and Accept-
ance Doctrine,'' 36 CoL. L. R.Ev. 920 (1936). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (1876). On the effect of a seal, see 1 CoR.BIN, 
CoNTRAcrs §252 (1950). As to whether mailing is sufficient part performance to hold the 
offer open, see 25 IND. L. R.Ev. 202 (1949). 
11 See 17 UNIV. CHI. L. R.Ev. 375 (1949). 
12 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1953) tit. 12a, §2-205; 40 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 
1949) tit. 40, §33.5. 
13 Note 7 supra. 
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v. Lindsell, that the offer can provide that the acceptance will not be final 
until received.14 The government's invitation to bid in the principal case 
indicates that this may well have been intended.15 Secondly, even if the 
Adams v. Lindsell doctrine were applied to the case, relief might have been 
granted on the basis of mistake. Usually rescission of a contract will not 
be decreed for a unilateral mistake.16 However, according to a leading 
commentator, a more liberal view will permit relief when the mistake is 
substantial and when, as in this case, the acceptor has not relied to his 
detriment before notice of the mistake.17 Since these long-established postal 
regulations have not led other courts to repudiate Adams v. Lindsell, it 
seems unlikely that the principal case will start a general trend in this 
direction. 
Norman A. Zilber, S. Ed. 
14 Spratt v. Paramount Pictures, 178 Misc. 682, 35 N.Y.S. (2d) 815 (1942); Clifford-
Bell Petroleum Co. v. Banker's Petroleum and Refining Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 286 
s.w. 564. 
15 The court only mentioned this in passing as supporting its interpretation of the 
effect of postal regulations. Certainly the wording of the invitation to bid does not leave 
the draftman's intent free from doubt. 
16 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §609 (1950). 
17 Ibid. 
